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About the Project 
The Cyberterrorism Project is an international, interdisciplinary research network that 
was established by academics working across a number of fields including 
Engineering, Law and Politics in 2011. The project has four primary objectives: 
(1) To further understanding amongst the scientific community by engaging in 
original research on the concept, threat and possible responses to 
cyberterrorism.  
(2) To facilitate global networking activities around this research theme.  
(3) To engage with policymakers, opinion formers, citizens and other 
stakeholders at all stages of the research process, from data collection to 
dissemination. 
(4) To do the above within a multidisciplinary and pluralist context that draws on 
expertise from the physical and social sciences.  
Recent activities of the Cyberterrorism Project include hosting conferences in 
Birmingham (UK) and Swansea (UK), constructing a database of international 
definitions of cyberterrorism and conducting a study of media constructions of 
cyberterrorism. Findings from these activities have been published in top international 
journals including Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Perspectives on Terrorism, and, Journal of Terrorism Research, and in books including 
Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment and Response (Springer, 2014), 
Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology (Routledge, 2015), and, Violent 
Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet (Routledge, 2016). 
Further information on the project, its members, and ongoing research activities is 
available via the project website: www.cyberterrorism-project.org. 
For membership and media enquiries please contact the project directors (p. 43). 
 
Preface 
This report contains findings from the Advanced Research Workshop supported by the 
NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme on terrorists’ use of the Internet, 
held at Dublin City University on 27th-29th June 2016. The event was co-organised by 
the Cyberterrorism Project and the VOX-POL Network of Excellence.  The workshop 
consisted of a total of 31 presentations, followed by a roundtable discussion during 
which participants formulated a set of recommendations. 60 delegates attended the 
symposium, from 13 different countries, including researchers and representatives 
from NATO HQ, NATO CCD-COE, UNICRI, the European Defence Agency, the Bavarian 
Police Academy and the Italian Carabinieri. 
This report provides summaries of each of the presentations and presents the 
workshop’s final recommendations 
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Introduction 
Two of the global threats identified by the US Intelligence Community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat 
Assessment were cyber and technology, and terrorism. The aim of this workshop was to examine 
the convergence of these threats.  
It is well-known that terrorist organisations already make wide use of the Internet. Online terrorist 
activities include: 
● Radicalisation and recruitment: Recruitment and radicalisation are amongst the top 
priorities for terrorist organisations online. This is unsurprising, since the worldwide reach of 
the Internet provides terrorist organisations with a global pool of potential recruits. 
● Propaganda: Terrorist organisations use a range of social media and multimedia formats. 
This gives them direct control over the distribution and reach of their message and of its 
content, allowing them the opportunity to shape how they and their adversaries are 
perceived by different target audiences. 
● Planning: Much of the information needed to plan a physical attack is publicly available 
online, numerous tools are available to facilitate data collection and online searching 
capabilities allow terrorists to capture information anonymously and with little effort or 
expense, while mitigating the risk involved in offline reconnaissance operations. 
● Communication within terrorist groups: Email allows for asynchronous communication, 
whilst Internet Relay Chat applications such as Skype can be used for synchronous 
communication in conjunction with anonymising software. 
● Training: The range of resources that are available online, from bomb-making manuals to 
instructional guides on encryption and surveillance avoidance, mean that the Internet has 
the potential to operate as a virtual training camp. 
● Fund-raising: Terrorist organisations have used various methods to raise and transfer funds 
online, including: direct solicitation; selling CDs, DVDs, badges, flags and books; diverting 
funds intended for seemingly legitimate organisations like charities; and, cybercrime such 
as identity theft. 
● Cyberattack: Terrorist organisations have expressed an interest in developing offensive 
cyber capabilities. These include the strategic use of malware as a weapon.  
The aims of the workshop were therefore as follows: 
● To assess the threat of terrorists launching cyberattacks and evaluate methods of improving 
protection of critical infrastructure; 
● To deepen existing understanding of the different ways in which terrorists use the Internet 
and produce recommendations for the formulation of laws and policies to counter this 
threat; 
● To evaluate these legislative and policy responses in terms of their impact on democracy, 
liberty and the rule of law; 
● To generate innovative, interdisciplinary and robust methodologies and techniques for the 
study of terrorists’ online activities; and, 
● To evaluate the opportunities that the Internet provides for intelligence and enforcement 
agencies, not only for surveillance and intelligence but also the construction and promotion 
of counter-narratives and other strategic communications. 
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A further aim of the workshop was to nurture dialogue between members of the academic, policy 
and practitioner communities. The participants therefore included representatives from each of 
these communities. As well as bridging the gap between academia and practice, the workshop also 
sought to bridge disciplinary divides. The participants had a wide range of expertise (including 
engineering, computer science, law, criminology, political science, international relations, history, 
and linguistics).  
This report provides summaries of each of the presentations and presents the workshop’s final 
recommendations.   
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Cyberterrorism: Assessment and Response 
Analysis of Cyberterrorism Threats to Internet of Things (IoT) 
Applications 
Dr Hayrettin Bahşi, Tallinn University of Technology 
Bahsi addressed the impact of ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) applications on the landscape of 
cybersecurity, contextualising it by contrasting it to existing Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisitions (SCADA) systems. He explained that the latter are often used in critical infrastructure 
systems (such as gas, electrics, and transportation) and thus have already undergone thorough 
analysis with regard to the cost-benefit equation and the potential physical result of a cyberattack. 
Bahsi began by introducing the current cybersecurity landscape, which is very information centric, an 
approach which seeks to analyse the physical results of an attack on a critical infrastructure. He then 
explored the motivation of threat actors in the current landscape, illustrating that the actors’ 
approach is a very rational one based on cost considerations and picking methods requiring the least 
effort and equipment in order to evade detection. Bahsi identified cyber espionage as being 
particularly attractive, especially among state-sponsored actors, as hacking offers a relatively safe 
and easy way of gaining political and economic advantage. 
Bahsi then discussed how IoT applications might change the cybersecurity landscape. To this end, 
Bahsi considered the questions of how physical results might be created via cyber attacks on IoT 
applications and whether IoT applications can change the cost-benefit equation. Bahsi took a 
hypothetical look at smart healthcare systems as the IoT in question in order to elucidate how the 
landscape might change.  
With regard to healthcare, Bahsi noted that systems are dominated by a concern for patient privacy, 
as opposed to concern for safety, which dominates SCADA systems. This difference in priorities, 
coupled with the lack of sophistication in connectivity technology within smart health systems, 
makes the health sector the most breached sub-sector. Bahsi pointed out that the emphasis on 
safety in critical infrastructure organisations gives an additional advantage to them in developing 
better contingency plans and maintenance procedures, which in turn helps to improve their incident 
response capabilities. Bahsi added that the collection of data over the Internet makes smart 
healthcare systems more vulnerable to Internet-based attacks.  
In comparing the factors motivating a potential cyber attacker (e.g. physical result, probability of 
success), Bahsi asserted that an attack on a critical infrastructure using SCADA is less likely but 
probably more impactful whereas an attack on an IoT application is more likely but probably less 
impactful. Bahsi then concluded that the overall impact of cyberterrorist activity on IoT applications 
may not be as high as the impact on critical infrastructures, however they may still be a reasonable 
target for terrorists due to the possible physical results.   
Bahsi therefore recommended that, as happened with SCADA systems, a detailed analysis of IoT 
applications should take place, particularly with regard to the cost-benefit equation and of the 
physical results of a cyber attack. 
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Novel Approaches for Cyber Risk Management 
Dr Theo Tryfonas, University of Bristol 
Tryfonas’s presentation concerned the need for a strategy for cyber risk management to be both 
cost-effective and cost-efficient. Tryfonas assessed the current strategy for cyber risk management 
and suggested a novel approach to both cover the shortcomings of the traditional approach and to 
fulfill the need for the strategy to be cost effective. 
With regard to the existing approach, Tryfonas focused on the need to protect critical infrastructures 
using Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which could be particularly attractive targets for 
cyberterrorists (e.g. a city’s traffic lights control system). The current approach  was described by 
Tryfonas as being one of risk management whereby the risk is assessed by considering the 
characteristics of the systems and the impact of a successful attack, after which a recommendation 
is made for a defence mechanism to minimise the risks.  
The deficiency in this approach, Tryfonas argued, is that it is an adaptation of existing methods used 
to assess risks in commercial enterprise systems, and is thus tailored to that landscape, rather than 
to the landscape of critical infrastructures. Furthermore, there is a tendency for this approach to 
disregard the growing interdependence between the components within an ICS and also across 
different ICSs. Tryfonas was also sceptical that the existing approach has the necessary flexibility to 
keep pace with the evolving threat landscape and the variety and multiplicity of attacks. 
The novel approach that Tryfonas suggested to address these shortcomings is an amalgamation of 
the Viable Systems Model (VSM) and Game Theory. To illustrate it Tryfonas explained the workings 
of each. The VSM that Tryfonas employed was developed by Stafford Beer in 1972, with the purpose 
of representing a system of interest (e.g. an organisation) through a living analogy that can be used 
to assess the criticality of a subsystem/asset via its interconnections to other subsystems/assets. 
The suggested approach does so by using a formula containing a number of variables (with values 
ascribed to each variable), namely the market price, the number of connections, the effect on other 
ICSs, and the role of the cyber component. Tryfonas then explained how Game Theory can be used 
to create a hypothetical game between an attacker and a defender to determine the most cost-
effective strategies for both via a cost-benefit analysis. 
Tryfonas concluded with an assessment of the novel joint VSM-Game Theory strategy, which he 
argued provides a cost-efficient defence approach that accounts for interconnectivity within and 
across ICSs. Tryfonas accepted, however, that the strategy requires validation against real data in 
order to be considered an applicable approach to protecting ICSs. 
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Cyber Defence in a Multinational Environment 
Paul Shorte, Aide de Camp to the United Nations Head of Mission and Force Commander in Lebanon 
Shorte’s presentation addressed the issues of cyber defence on the various networks across NATO, 
considering the problems of information sharing and system degradation. Shorte first outlined the 
levels of policy that each network has – strategic (largely consisting of national policy), operational, 
and tactical – and then considered the issues of interoperability when networks must work together.  
With regard to interoperability issues, Shorte highlighted the Afghanistan mission, whereby 48 troop-
contributing countries had to work on a multitude of networks based on the security clearance 
afforded to each individual nation, i.e. “FYVE” (Five Eyes), in order to work together. Shorte explained 
that the reluctance of nations to grant access to their deployed systems, due to fear of disclosing 
weaknesses in cybersecurity, means that multinational policy will lag behind national policy. Shorte 
noted the challenges within the UN system and the lack of a specific cyber defence policy despite 
having developed policy in many other areas and cyber defence being such a significant multinational 
issue. Moreover, within the UN key information is often transmitted between various missions using 
a tried and trusted method: via fax. 
Shorte then addressed the issue of information sharing, which he framed with reference to the 
famous Sun Tzu quote from The Art of War “If you know your enemy and you know yourself, you need 
not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Focusing on the problems of NATO “knowing itself”, one 
such problem is the huge system degradation. Shorte pointed out that many NATO systems are slowly 
becoming outdated, having been built for specific operating systems and outdated versions of 
software where known vulnerabilities exist. Shorte explained that this is of huge cost to NATO and 
seriously constrains its operational capability at cyber level due to it not “knowing itself”.  
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Cyberterrorism – a challenge both for external and internal security:  
Countering cyberterrorism – a task for law enforcement agencies and 
the military in crisis management operations 
Wolfgang Röhrig, European Defence Agency 
Röhrig’s paper began by outlining the changes in terrorism over the last 45 years, from the IRA and 
centralized coordination structures, to today’s IS/Daesh and global missionary propagation of 
Islamist Ideology and the worldwide caliphate. This includes the link to cyberterrorism, where 
terrorists have become adaptive to ‘Technology Development’ in order to radicalise, recruit, fund-
raise and communicate anonymously.  
The increased sophistication of terrorist’s use of the internet and the threat this poses needs to be 
handled by Crisis Management Operations. Röhrig discussed the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ as expanded in 
2009 in the TEU article 42 as an example of crisis management operations. Röhrig then revealed 
that the current situation of the military is that it is becoming increasingly dependent on civilian 
(critical) infrastructures and services (at home and in the AoR (Area of Responsibility)) and that the 
military is constantly growing and becoming increasingly complex with interconnected networks 
(Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC)). This rapid development is due to the velocity of new threats 
and vulnerabilities the military faces every day.  
Röhrig went on to discuss domestic substantive criminal and procedural law and the criminalisation 
of conduct in cyberspace. Despite this, Röhrig highlighted that within national boundaries, countering 
cyberterrorism is in general a task for law enforcement agencies and national regulations and 
policies define the role and the limitations for the engagement of the military. He then continued by 
explaining the military’s role in counterterrorism post-9/11 involves a paradigm shift from symmetric 
warfare to counter asymmetric threats with military means. Due to the events of 9/11 military 
capabilities had to be improved by, for example, countering Improvised Explosive Devices and 
Longhaul communications. In order to respond to technological developments, remotely piloted 
systems and robotics/ autonomous systems have been created in order to access the full spectrum 
of electronic and digital connectivity and dominance.  
Commander’s/ Mission Head’s key questions related to cyber along the Operational Planning 
Process (OPP) were then demonstrated and discussed briefly by Röhrig, by interpreting the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LoAC ) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in combination with the Tallinn 
Manual, leading onto the complementary use of law enforcement agencies and the military in 
countering cyberterrorism operations. He explained that, when applying the LoAC and IHL in 
combination with the Tallinn Manual, cyberterrorism is not just using electronic means (cyberspace) 
for coordinating and sharing information of terrorist activities but the use of force that constitutes 
the level of an armed attack in order to spread terror. A cyberattack on military installations by 
terrorists does not automatically fulfil this definition of cyberterrorism.   
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How to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures: Roles and 
Responsibilities for Military, Public and Private Sectors 
Dr Gokhan Ikitemur, Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs; Unal Tatar, Old Dominion University 
Ikitemur and Tatar began their presentation by looking into national cybersecurity from a managerial 
perspective, including their case study of Turkey, to demonstrate the new era, in which the lines 
between public and private spheres have blurred. They explained that cybersecurity is not only a 
technical but also a governance problem since it does not fit conventional security categories. The 
other underlying reasons for the governance problem are that the private sector is no longer the sole 
consumer of nation states’ security blanket, and national cybersecurity is not a single subject area, 
it is generally divided into five distinct mandates (military, counter, intelligence, critical infrastructure 
and protection).  
Ikitemur and Tatar chose Turkey as their case study because of the country’s socio-economic 
dynamics, but mainly because Turkey is interested in developing national cybersecurity governance 
and therefore protecting itself against exponential cyber threats. Due to this, Turkey established a 
Cyber Security Council in 2012, prepared a national cybersecurity strategy for 2013-2015 and later 
moved onto their second strategy (2016-2019) to resolve the deficiencies of the previous one. 
Ikitemur and Tatar discussed different regulation mechanisms and approaches to securing critical 
infrastructures, which are owned or operated mostly by the private sector. The balance between 
regulation and cooperation (or voluntary approach) depends on several factors specific to the nation 
such as current governance structures, percentage of private sector ownership of national critical 
infrastructures, culture and level of trust between government and the private sector. According to a 
Delphi survey conducted on critical infrastructure operators, government regulation is almost 
mandatory to raise the maturity of level and cybersecurity readiness of private sector. 
To conclude their paper, Ikitemur and Tatar highlighted their key findings and recommendations. 
They suggested that closing the gap between maker understanding and frontline realities is essential 
in producing a reliable cybersecurity system and that a traditional hierarchy within governance yields 
collaborative engagement (as new skill sets are required). ‘Red Teaming’ is also recommended to 
examine the nature of the distribution of roles and responsibilities to see if the current 
situation/dynamic is problematic or not. However, Ikitemur and Tatar ended their presentation by 
suggesting that innovative solutions are required which enhance cybersecurity without creating 
barriers to innovation, economic growth, and the free flow of information in order to cope with the 
challenges of national cybersecurity governance. 
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International cooperation in facing the cyberterrorism threat 
Dr Camino Kavanagh, King’s College London; Dr Madeline Carr, Cardiff University; Adam Hadley, 
ICT4Peace 
This presentation examined terrorist use of the internet, ICT and cyberspace, and identified a number 
of emerging principles, norms and cooperative measures underpinning the response by public and 
private actors.  
Hadley first described the manner in which the internet and ICT are being used for terrorist purposes 
including strategic communications, command and control, grooming, recruitment, and financing. 
Kavanagh then discussed the nature of the response, including the ever-blurring line between the 
public and the private sphere when dealing with terrorist-related online content. Emphasis was 
placed on the increasing reliance of governments on technology and social media companies to 
remove terrorist related content and related questions of legitimacy, transparency and accountability.  
With the policy and academic community already struggling to define ‘terrorism’, Kavanagh also 
noted how one company was attempting to overcome this hurdle by considering terrorist content to 
be any material posted by or in support of organisations included on the Consolidated United Nations 
Security Council Sanctions List. She also emphasized some of the challenges of dealing with the 
‘whack-a-mole’ effect, whereby content taken down on one site is often reposted elsewhere, 
providing examples of how some companies are developing automated tools to scan, detect and 
remove terrorist content (notably images, audio and video) after it has been removed from one site.  
Beyond the growing challenges of balancing security and rights in public and private responses to 
terrorist use of the internet and ICT, the authors questioned the effectiveness of existing approaches, 
noting in particular the absence of any mechanisms to assess their mid- to long-term effectiveness 
as well as the challenges in linking technology-based approaches to the deeper structural societal 
drivers of terrorism and violent extremism.  
Lastly Carr discussed concerns relating to potential cyber attacks by terrorist groups against critical 
infrastructure, noting in particular how reference to the latter was included in the 2015 report of the 
UN Group of Governmental Experts on ‘On Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications In the Context of International Security’. She also discussed a number of 
cooperative measures that are helping shape the response to existing vulnerabilities as a means to 
mitigate the threat.  
Carr concluded her talk by reflecting on important challenges, including lacunae in international law 
relating to the protection of the global submarine fiber optic cable system through which 95 percent 
of global communications flow. The presentation left listeners with the nagging question of how the 
international community, already struggling to protect the simpler elements of information 
communication systems, can enhance and accelerate ongoing efforts aimed at protecting critical 
infrastructure from intentional interference such as terrorist attacks. 
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The Nature of States’ obligations in the fight against cyber-terrorism 
Dr Karine Bannelier, Université Grenoble-Alpes 
Bannelier’s presentation (delivered on her behalf by Prof Theodore Christakis) discussed the question 
of how responsible state behaviour should be defined in cyberspace, focusing particularly on the 
principle of due diligence. Bannelier explained that there is some debate as to whether the principle 
of due diligence applies to cyberspace. This debate stems from the use of the word “should” in 
reports produced by the UN Group of Governmental Experts. Bannelier argued that the word should 
be interpreted as meaning mandatory. She therefore drew attention to the 1949 Corfu case, in which 
it was found that a state has a general obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other states. Territorial sovereignty entails not only rights, but also duties 
to other states. 
Bannelier then considered the content of the due diligence principle. She argued that it should be 
interpreted as an obligation of conduct not an obligation of results. It should require that reasonable 
steps are taken: the level of diligence required should be proportionate to the dignity and strength of 
the power exercising it.  
Bannelier warned against the ‘unwilling and unable’ test that was used by the US and UK as a 
justification for action in Syria. The ‘unwilling and unable’ test imposes an obligation of results over 
conduct upon the state in regards to non-state actors acting within its borders. To the extent that the 
‘unwilling or unable’ theory was used in relation to the fight against terrorism and could, for instance, 
be invoked in the future in relation to cyberterrorism (or other malicious hostile actions by cyber-
actors) it should be made clear that due diligence is not an obligation of result in addressing the 
consequences of a situation where a state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to ensure that its territory and 
critical infrastructures are used by non-state actors for harmful cyber operations against third states. 
Bannelier then discussed when states have an obligation under the due diligence principle. Here, 
knowledge is key. Knowledge in this context includes constructive knowledge – which is important 
in the cyber domain where there are limits to actual knowledge. 
Finally, Bannelier considered whether the due diligence principle extends to preventive steps. 
Although some states argue that the principle applies only to ongoing cyber operations, there is 
plenty of evidence that it is not limited in this way. 
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(En)Gendering Cyberterrorism in the UK news media: A discursive analysis 
Dr Lee Jarvis, University of East Anglia 
This paper explored how news media outlets portray cyberterrorism, and the importance of 
assumptions about gender within this. It drew on a wider empirical study with Stuart Macdonald and 
Andrew Whiting which investigated thirty-one news outlets within seven different countries, between 
the 1st January 2008 to 8th June 2013. Five hundred and thirty-five relevant items for analysis were 
taken from the dataset. With the data set amassed, two research questions were asked for this 
paper:  
1. How is cyberterrorism given identity in news media discourse? 
2. How is the discourse ‘gendered’? 
This paper examined how the news media portrays cyberterrorists and the threat of cyberterrorism 
in a very particular way. On the one hand, cyberterrorists are depicted as strong, resourceful, agential 
and determined. On the other, the ‘self’ that is threatened by cyberterrorism is widely presented as 
weak, ill-prepared and passive in the face of this threat. Nobody, it seems, is safe from this ‘faceless’ 
threat on the internet, and we are regularly warned about our dependence on digital architectures 
and technologies. These warnings are compounded by the widespread use of seemingly plausible 
hypothetical worst case scenarios. 
The second part of the paper began by exploring how this construction of threat is implicitly gendered. 
The paper argued that the representation of cyberterrorists as resourceful, strong and determined 
relies upon longstanding assumptions about masculinity. The ‘self’ that is threatened, in contrast, is 
constructed in stereotypically feminine language: as passive and threatened. This is compounded, in 
news media coverage, by the focus on specific stories and pictures of ‘dangerous’ men, while women 
– when they are spoken about – are frequently spoken about as fragile and helpless victims, mothers 
or wives. It is very common in the media that masculinity is obscured when there is a need to invoke 
‘innocence’ in a person. Demonising a person, on the other hand, often makes use of more 
stereotypically masculine constructs. 
The paper concluded by exploring questions of authority and authorship within this news coverage. 
It showed that these news items are – overwhelmingly – stories that are (i) written by men, (ii) about 
other, often imaginary, men, (iii) heavily reliant on the authority of cited male ‘experts’, and (iv) 
illustrated by accompanying pictures of men and machines.  
Cyberterrorism news media discourse, in short, produces this threat in a very particular gendered 
way. 
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The terrorist - hacker/hacktivist distinction 
Leonie Tanczer, Queen’s University Belfast 
Tanczer started her presentation by highlighting that many hacker and hacktivist actions get 
entangled with (cyber)terrorism. However, no convincing data on their actual involvement in 
terrorism exists. Besides, the level of severity required for an act to be classified as cyberterrorism is 
contentious. Tanczer referred to a definition offered by Denning (2000) whereby cyberterrorism 
constitutes a serious attack against critical infrastructure and must cause enough harm to generate 
fear. Incidents that disrupt nonessential services or are mainly a costly nuisance would not. Based 
on this understanding, Tanczer criticised the comparison of hacking and hacktivism with 
cyberterrorism and used the conceptual ambiguity of these terms as a starting point for her analysis.  
Tanczer’s presentation was based on findings derived from her PhD thesis. In the course of this, she 
examined the understanding of hacking and hacktivism in the sphere of politics and industry, as well 
as amongst hackers and hacktivists themselves. She conducted interviews with self-identified 
hackers and hacktivists (n = 35) and used the results of this study to provide an overview of how this 
community actually perceives itself. Her presentation had two parts. The first examined assessments 
of hacking and hacktivism by external actors (e.g., politicians, the media etc.). This was done due to 
the fact that, in most cases, her participants would begin by responding to her questions by 
describing what others generally think of them.  The second part then outlined the self-assessment 
of hackers and hacktivists. 
One of the most profound findings of Tanczer’s research was that interviewees argued that they are 
actively being criminalised. This is done through practices of instrumentalisation, which she defined 
as the purposeful attempt to construct them as a security threat. The hacker and hacktivist 
community would be faced with practices of Othering (e.g., comparison to ‘modern folk devils’), 
dynamics of equation (e.g., equation with terrorism) as well as overestimations (e.g., comparison to 
cyberwarfare). Their construction as alleged “sociopaths” or “weirdos” would allow for their 
stigmatisation.  
Tanczer also discussed her interviewees’ views of their potential status within society (i.e., being 
beneficial and part of an ‘eco-system’) as well as their potential prosecution. She presented quotes 
from the interviews which highlighted the possible legitimisation of hackers and hacktivists and 
criticism of the harsh punishment of any form of computer misuse. According to her interviewees 
legal mechanisms should be in place that account for the diverse circumstances of a hack. This 
allowed for the fact that hacktivism is in many instances considered to be an online form of protest 
and civil disobedience. Interviewees also emphasised that there should be legal ways of being a 
hacker or a hacktivist. 
Tanczer also urged caution about treating activism, criminal activities and terrorism interchangeably. 
She noted that we would never include offline activism, such as conducted by Greenpeace, with, for 
example, organised crime. Yet, it is commonplace to make such careless groupings in the online 
sphere. While we have legal protections for standing in front of a company or engaging in offline civil 
disobedience, its online equivalent is securitised and appears in online threat reports. 
Tanczer finished her presentation by arguing for a shift of focus. Rather than automatically 
criminalising hacking and hacktivism, we should: (a) find a way to talk consistently about these 
phenomena; (b) engage and respond to these actions and actors sufficiently and appropriately; (c) 
begin a conversation about strengthening liberties online; and, (d) most importantly, allow research 
on the ‘edges’ of society to proceed. Only then will society be able to obtain a comprehensive 
assessment of such phenomena, including their potential security benefits). 
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Reality check: Assessing the unlikelihood of cyberterrorism 
Prof Maura Conway, Dublin City University 
Conway set out the argument, based on simple cost-benefit logic, that significant cyberterrorism 
attacks remain unlikely due to their high degree of difficulty and cost when compared to much more 
simple and commonplace means, such as car bombs. She pointed out that a lot of the research and 
commentary in this area focuses very much on technology, highlighting the fact that cyber 
infrastructures are not well secured. Globally, critical cyber infrastructures are vulnerable to attack 
by a whole range of actors; terrorists are not the ones we should be concerned about right now, she 
argued. 
By way of a ‘reality check’, Conway’s presentation compared the ease and low cost of Vehicle Born 
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) or car bomb attacks versus cyberterrorism. The former have 
been used widely (e.g., Northern Ireland, Middle East, Sri Lanka, etc.) and with high levels of 
destructiveness. No act of cyberterrorism has ever yet occurred making comparisons difficult to carry 
out but, given, the attention to the cyberterrorism threat by media, policymakers, the Internet security 
industry, and others, nonetheless necessary. 
Conway described four factors useful for calculating the probabilities of different types of terrorist 
attacks: cost; complexity; destruction; and, media impacts. 
As regards cost: the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) attack cost c.US$400. The Oklahoma City 
bombing killed 168 people in 1995 and cost about US$5,000. Estimates for the 9/11 attacks put 
the cost at about half a million US dollars. In 2006, the Pentagon put the average cost of an Afghan 
car bomb at US$1,675; the cost is unlikely to be greatly increased today.  
With regard to complexity: many people worldwide have the know-how to construct VBIEDs. Reliable 
information about their construction is also accessible online. A major cyberterrorism attack, on the 
other hand, would require high-level technical knowledge that is not readily available to terrorists. 
The IT skills of violent Jihadis, for example, are not superior to those of the general public (although 
their PR department would have us believe otherwise), and hiring hackers to undertake such activity 
on behalf of a terrorist group could severely compromise the latter’s security and has no guarantee 
of success.  
On destructiveness: some of the obvious choices for a cyberterrorism attack – a hydroelectric dam 
or an air traffic control centre, for example – are not immediately attractive as they could much more 
easily be attacked using conventional means. Even if terrorists did manage to target the power grid 
somehow, we are more resilient than we think: power outages, even massive ones, occur frequently 
(e.g., due to fallen trees, faults, etc.) and nothing really happens. 
Finally, media impacts are worthy of consideration: (live) moving images are crucial for truly 
spectacular terrorist events. There is no immediate theatricality in taking down a power grid or 
shutting down a water supply. Worse, from a terrorism perspective, the acts might be so low key as 
not to be considered terrorism or to be perceived or portrayed as accident or technology failure, etc. 
To claim such actions are still appealing to terrorists is to fundamentally misunderstand what 
terrorists want. 
Comparing the relative ease, simplicity, low cost and high impact of car bombs with potential 
cyberterrorism attacks, both physically and in terms of media coverage, a cyber-attack does not 
seem a very appealing option for terrorists. 
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Weapons, wilderness and pathogens: investigating the techno-strategic 
language of the internet security industry 
Dr Andrew Whiting, Birmingham City University 
The primary interest of the paper was to investigate the manner in which cyber-threats were depicted 
by experts within a particular aspect of the cyber-security industry.  Carol Cohn’s 1987 study into 
defence intellectuals and techno-strategic language provided the theoretical lens through which this 
particular aspect of the internet security discourse was analysed.   
The paper began by identifying the continued interest in nightmare scenarios within discussions 
surrounding cybersecurity and the tendency to speculate around a series of “what ifs?”.  Whiting 
equated this tendency to a “common sense” that has built up around the topic and argued that 
investigating cyber expert discourse is important to understand how this common sense has formed 
due to its powerful constitutive impact; a claim he sought to evidence with reference to notions of 
technification, security professionals and authorities of delimitation. 
Whiting then elaborated on Cohn’s study in which she gained access to a  U.S. centre of nuclear 
strategy and while working alongside defence intellectuals observed the use of a particular language 
characterised as “techno-strategic”.  This language was heavily technified and included a prevalence 
of acronyms and metaphors that contributed towards a wider abstracting effect.  This language had 
a significant framing effect, excluding, prioritising and organising the subject matter and with this in 
mind Whiting’s research endeavoured to identify a similar language within the internet security 
industry.  This was achieved via a discourse analysis of documents produced by a range of internet 
security companies between the years of 1997 and 2013, companies most commonly associated 
with the anti-virus products they produce (e.g.  Kaspersky, AVG, Symantec).  
Themes of vulnerability and destructiveness were evident within the discourse and manifested 
themselves prominently in a number of metaphors.  Malware, for example, was synonymised 
frequently with pathogens and poisons in need of ‘disinfection’, while cyberspace itself was likened 
to the wilderness (a sort of cyber jungle full of predators and prey) or as a revisionist Wild West 
(anarchic, unruly, a sort Hobbesian state of nature).  Destruction manifested itself through militaristic 
language and metaphor (i.e., weapons, arms race, cyber war, etc.).  IT professionals became 
‘soldiers’, ‘warriors’ or ‘generals’ while the malware itself were often characterised as ‘bullets’, 
‘bombs’ and ‘missiles’.  Furthermore historic military metaphors were widespread with 
developments in cybersecurity likened to the Trinity tests, the Cold War, Pearl Harbour and 9/11. 
Having established all of this Whiting posed the question of why any of this should matter to us?  His 
response was that given the constitutive and productive power of discourse metaphors such as these 
serve to distil the complex into something more readily graspable and have an important role to play 
in the formulation of cybersecurity knowledge.  This, in turn, can compound the seriousness, 
organises and prioritise responses and determines what is sayable and unsayable within debates on 
this area. 
Whiting concluded by acknowledging how the metaphors identified here differ from those identified 
by Cohn, that instead of distancing the speaker from the actuality in this domain they serve to 
accentuate the threat.  He also acknowledged the different role the internet security industry plays 
in comparison to the nuclear strategic centre Cohn focused on.  The former of these sites having both 
a requirement to sell a product or products as well as communicate to a number of different 
audiences (including the public).  Nevertheless, these companies still maintain expert status and 
further research should be conducted to explore this and other forms of cyber expert discourse as 
well as the intertextualities between these and policy and security discourses to illuminate the 
relationship that exists between them and the implications this has on resource allocation, policy 
and security practice. 
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Online Propaganda and Radicalization 
Back to the Future: Online Propaganda and Radicalisation 
Dr Alastair Reed, Leiden University 
Reed began his presentation by stating that, when confronting the challenges presented by online 
content from the likes of al-Qaeda and Islamic State, there has been a tendency within the 
counterterrorism academic and strategic-policy fields to focus on what is new about this extremist 
propaganda. This results in it being portrayed as a unique threat, with emphasis being placed on the 
use of modern social media tools such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. This results in 
insufficient efforts being made to look at the past to see what lessons from can be learnt from history 
when responding to the contemporary threat. Reed’s presentation therefore sought to place the 
current propaganda challenge into historical perspective and to identify crucial lessons learnt that 
are relevant to today’s counterterrorism strategic communication campaigns. 
Drawing on past communication campaigns from the American War of Independence, the Great 
Wars and the War on Terror, Reed argued that the evolution of propaganda in conflict has always 
been driven by three factors: developments in modern communication technology; advancements in 
military technology and strategy; and, the shifting relationship between the political elite and the 
populace. The struggle against AQ and IS propaganda should be understood in this historical context, 
from which lessons can be learnt for current counterterrorism strategic communication campaigns. 
From this, Reed set out a framework consisting of macro, mezzo and micro level considerations. At 
the macro level, the considerations are reach, relevance and resonance. At the mezzo level, the 
considerations are medium, messenger and format. And at the micro level, the considerations are 
rational and identity choice appeals, defensive and offensive messaging (history shows that you need 
offensive strategic communications campaigns as well as defensive ones) and the say-do gap (there 
can’t be a divergence between what you say and what you actually do). 
Based on this framework, Reed set out four principles for the design of communication campaigns 
to counter violent extremism in the 21st century. There should be a diversity of messaging (rational 
and identity choice appeals, offensive and defensive messaging). There should a core theme (or 
grand narrative). A variety of media should be used. And strategic communications should be 
synchronised with political and military actions. 
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Predicting the Emergence of Self-Radicalisation through Social Media: A 
Complex Systems Approach 
Prof Roger Bradbury, Australian National University 
Bradbury began by stating the objective of his research: to predict the emergence of self-
radicalisation through an empirical analysis of messages on social media. The approach is based on 
complex systems science. Underlying the study were three hypotheses regarding self-radicalisation. 
The first was that individuals reveal their ‘identity’ through their texts. The second  was that self-
radicalisation is a ‘tipping-point’ phenomenon, akin to a disorder/order phase transition where 
identity shifts rapidly from one metastable state to another. And third, an individual’s identity will 
show critical slowing down prior to this change in state – the characteristic dynamics that predict the 
approach of a ‘tipping-point’. The ambition of the study was to use complex systems science to create 
a data-driven real-time empirical analysis of the problem and to generate actionable predictions.  
The first hypothesis is based on a forthcoming study which used a text analysis system called RPAS. 
Bradbury explained that the RPAS system uses indicators from a person’s writing to create a stylistic 
signature. RPAS stands for Richness, Personal Pronouns, Referential Activity, Power and Sensory. 
Bradbury explained that it is possible to discriminate between individuals, and that identity is stable 
and consistent over time. Therefore, changes in identity can be related to major changes in the 
individual’s psychological state. Indeed, in relation to the second hypothesis, it is possible to relate 
key points in a person’s life to changes in their texts. 
On the third hypothesis, Bradbury suggested that before a person is radicalised there will be a critical 
slowing down before the individual’s thinking coalesces into a single unbreakable mind -set at the 
decision point. If it is possible to identify this slowing down, then the individual’s change of state 
could be predicted.  
Bradbury finished by explaining that the aim of his project is to identify a small population from a 
much larger population who are most likely to self-radicalise. Identifying this small population would 
allow agencies to focus their efforts more efficiently. 
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Prevention, anti-radicalisation and the role of social media: law 
enforcement agencies and their cooperation with other institutions 
Dr Holger Nitsch, Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime 
Research, Germany 
Recent terrorist attacks in Europe (both in Paris and Brussels) have brought into question why it is 
mostly young people who are influenced by radical ideologies. Nitsch suggested that with the spread 
of these ideologies, social media plays a very important role in regards to leading young individuals 
into believing radical and extremist ideas. He also suggested that even though social media is the 
main method of delivering these ideologies it can also be used as a counter measure, using the same 
persuasive techniques to promote de-radicalisation. The role of social media is exemplified in two 
case studies in Germany which were the focus of this presentation. 
The term ‘radical’ in itself does not necessarily lead to extremism; as certain individuals who support 
movements such as animal rights, women’s rights and racial equality can also be deemed radical, 
but perhaps not extremist. Nitsch depicted the process of radicalization in an individual as a pyramid, 
with the base being ‘neutral’ but rising to ‘sympathizers, ‘justifiers’ and at the very top of the pyramid: 
‘personal and moral obligation’ wherein a member feels like the ideologies of these radical groups 
become a moral obligation they must fulfil, the group is no longer a separate entity but converges 
with the identity of the individual. Nitsch went on to state that perhaps another reason as to why an 
individual may feel the appeal of these radical ideologies is due to a personal grievance they have 
suffered: extremist ideas then begin to act as a crutch for the personal grief. Due to the internet and 
the ease of publishing content, there is no end to where individuals can find ideas (forums, websites). 
With the array of social media platforms, the means of communication and exchange of conspiracy 
theory is very easy. This merely adds fuel to the already ignited fire in the individual and further 
persuades them to take on these beliefs.  
Though some of the various methods of de-radicalisation prove to be effective, no ‘perfect-method’ 
has been found yet. This is understandable since persuasive methods of radicalisation have yet to 
be proven to be perfect – highly effective perhaps, but there is no fail-proof method to either type of 
measure. Nitsch explained that studies show that both the lone wolf ideology and recruitment 
techniques prove equally successful in the spread of radicalisation. 
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Radicalisers as Regulators: An Examination of Dabiq Magazine 
Prof Stuart Macdonald, Swansea University 
Macdonald’s paper focused on the first 14 issues of Dabiq, the English language magazine published 
by the so-called Islamic State. The analytical framework he employed was the concept of responsive 
regulation. Macdonald conceded that at first there appear to be dissimilarities between this concept 
– which was devised by Ayres and Braithwaite as a contribution to debates on business regulation – 
and the production of jihadist magazines. However, he explained that regulation is not the sole 
preserve of the state – private actors can also regulate responsively – and regulatees may include 
individuals. Indeed, Braithwaite himself later applied the concept of responsive regulation to 
convicted offenders. The reason for employing responsive regulation as the analytical framework for 
this study was that, like attempts to radicalise, the aim of responsive regulation is to secure 
compliance with a set of norms by achieving attitudinal and behavioural change. Research into 
responsive regulation therefore offers the opportunity to gain fresh insights into radicalisation 
processes.  
Macdonald also explained that there are stark difference between the norms which business 
regulators seek to impose and those advocated by the producers of Dabiq. The norms enforced by 
business regulators are based on the current, physical world, whereas the norms advocated by the 
producers of Dabiq are based on the spiritual, as well as the physical, realm and on the hereafter as 
well as the here-and-now. This point is key to understanding the coercive power which the so-called 
Islamic State may potentially wield over those who live outside geographical areas under its control.  
Macdonald went on to outline the variety of persuasive techniques which Dabiq uses to regulate its 
readers, including presenting the benefits of adherence to IS (both physical and spiritual), 
emphasizing religious duty and warning of punishment. Macdonald explained that biographies of 
those killed in performance of jihad are frequently used to reinforce the promise of future spiritual 
benefits. 
One of the key features of responsive regulation is the way in which the various regulatory techniques 
are organised into a regulatory pyramid. Regulators begin at the base of the pyramid, attempting to 
coax compliance by persuasion. If this fails there follows escalation to the more coercive strategies 
higher up the pyramid. This avoids the negative psychological impact of immediate recourse to 
punishment which projects negative expectations onto the regulated actor. It also achieves a synergy 
between persuasion and punishment; regulatees are more likely to engage with persuasive 
techniques if they believe escalation in the event of non-compliance is inevitable. Macdonald 
explained that Dabiq presents future punishment as certain for those who do not act upon its call to 
jihad. Moreover, it presents the threat of punishment as emanating not from itself, but from Allah. 
Similarly, regulators depict the threat of future punishment as emanating from outside third forces 
as this helps construct relationships of trust with regulatees.  
Macdonald concluded by highlighting the emphasis Dabiq places on procedural fairness in its 
accounts of executions and punishments. Social justice research indicates that judgments about 
procedural fairness are as important as judgments about substantive fairness (if not more so). 
Indeed, Dabiq frequently juxtaposes the actions of IS with those of Western governments, which are 
depicted as unjust both procedurally and substantively.  This technique is used to consolidate 
sympathisers’ willingness to self-identify with the in-group (IS) and distance themselves from the out-
group (the West). 
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(De)legitimation in Terrorist Narratives: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse 
Studies Perspective 
Prof Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, Swansea University 
Lorenzo-Dus’ paper began by contesting the claim that the current supposed stagnation in the field 
of terrorism studies is due to an over reliance on the study of terrorists’ messages (i.e., their 
discourse). The aim of her presentation, she explained, was to offer a better understanding of how 
discourse analysis should be conducted and the potential value of such an approach by presenting 
the findings of a case study of the online jihadist magazines Dabiq and Inspire. 
Lorenzo-Dus explained that Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS), the discourse analysis 
method she used, is centrally committed to linking textual features to social practices. Its aim is to 
uncover non-obvious meanings; that is, meanings which might not be readily apparent to the naked 
eye. Having uncovered these non-obvious details through quantitative, software enabled tools, CADS 
then aims to explain and interpret them through qualitative linguistic analysis and insights from 
relevant non-linguistic disciplines. CADS follows an inductive approach which revolves around 
identifying frequency based lexical patterns within large corpora. While this does not remove 
subjectivity entirely from the analysis, it does make the analytic steps taken to identify these patterns 
replicable and accountable.  
Lorenzo-Dus then presented her case study. This focused in particular on the language used to de-
legitimize ‘the West’ and legitimate jihadist ideology groups’ violence against ‘non -believers’ in Al-
Qaeda’s magazine - Inspire - and the magazine of the so-called Islamic State - Dabiq. The study was 
guided by three propositions. 
First, religion plays a pivotal though controversial role within jihadist ideology, which is based on a 
modified version of the Islamic idea of da’wa. Da’wa traditionally consisted of peaceful missionary 
work but this has been subverted in its current usage as a justification for killing non-believers. 
Second, jihadist ideology is based on polarised argumentation. There is no middle ground; those in 
favour of jihad are glorified, those against are vilified. Third, jihadist groups are not homogenous. Al-
Qaeda believe in targeting the far enemy before the near while Islamic State focuses first on the 
near.  
The results of the study offer insights into how Dabiq and Inspire used different verbal attacks 
(impoliteness strategies, in linguistics) to delegitimise the West. Dabiq favoured the use of scorning 
and ridiculing, mainly targeted against Western leaders; Inspire favoured the use of distancing, 
primarily on religious grounds. The study results also showed that the two magazines used similar 
grounds when seeking to legitimise their violent acts against ‘non -believers’, especially those they 
labelled ‘kuffar’ and ‘murtaddin’. These combined ‘impersonal authority’ legitimation (that is, 
legitimation through religious law, rules and regulations) and mythopoesis (i.e., legitimation through 
narratives in which online jihads were portrayed as saviours).  
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Militant Islamist propaganda targeting Muslims in the West: Comparing 
Inspire and Dabiq narratives 
Dr Haroro J. Ingram, Australian National University 
Ingram presented the findings of a comparative study of the so-called Islamic State’s magazine 
Dabiq and Al-Qaeda’s magazine Inspire. His paper sought to explain how Inspire and Dabiq attempt 
to appeal to and radicalise English-speaking Muslims through the use of strategically designed in 
group, other, crisis and solution constructs which are variously interplayed through the use of value, 
dichotomy and crisis reinforcing narratives. While acknowledging the tendency for Western foreign 
fighters and ‘lone wolves’ to consume propaganda from both Al-Qaeda and IS, Ingram used Inspire 
as a comparator to Dabiq to offer insights into how and why IS supporters seem to radicalise more 
quickly.  
Ingram explained that, whilst Inspire is dominated by identity-choice messaging (i.e. appeals 
designed to coax audiences into making decisions based on identity), Dabiq balances identity-choice 
messaging with rational-choice messaging (i.e. appeals designed to lure audiences into making 
decisions based on a cost-benefit consideration of options). Regarding the latter, Dabiq presents 
reports of IS’s pragmatic actions that are contributing to security, stability and livelihood for 
populations under its control. This form of messaging is designed to compel its audience to engage 
in rational choice decision making, that is, decisions based on cost benefit consideration of options.  
At the same time as compelling rational choice decision making, Dabiq also proclaims messages 
that draw on perceptual factors, i.e., IS’s ‘cause’ particularly pertaining to its ideological contentions. 
These messages are designed to present IS as the champion and protector of Sunnis - the in-group 
identity. This formation simultaneously portrays IS’s enemies as being responsible for all the crises 
befalling the Sunni population. This form of messaging compels Dabiq’s audience to engage in 
identity choice decision making. Ingram emphasised the importance of Othering and in-group 
construction.  
Dabiq’s messaging is designed to fuel the process of cyclical cognitive reinforcement. As the in -group 
is portrayed as benevolent and responsible for solutions, and as an increasing number of crises are 
attributed to the in-group’s enemies – the Other – a self-reinforcing cycle emerges.  
Ingram concluded by outlining some key lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications 
from his analysis. The primary lesson was that counterterrorism strategies should avoid reinforcing 
the bifurcated worldview of violent extremist groups such as IS and Al-Qaeda. Messaging should 
instead be focused on two core themes designed to address rational and identity choice decision-
making processes. To address identity choice issues, counterterrorism strategic communications 
should highlight the range and diversity of identities rather than reinforce the bifurcated worldview 
of extremists. This should be part of a broader approach that seeks to reverse IS’s playbook. 
Counterterrorism strategic communications messaging should therefore seek to depict IS as the 
source of the Sunni population’s problems and western governments and allies as sources of 
practical solutions. Additionally, this messaging should always aim to highlight and accentuate the 
gap between what IS says and does while diminishing its own say-do gap. This approach is designed 
to not only boost the effects of politico-military/counterterrorism actions but disrupt the process of 
cyclical cognitive reinforcement in the favour of extremists. 
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In search for those who loose and bind: Views from al-Qaeda on how to 
appoint a caliph 
Dr Gunnar J. Weimann, independent researcher 
The aim of Weimann’s paper was to present an overview of al-Qaeda’s responses to the events of 
recent years: namely, the Arab Revolutions, increased use of social media and the rise of the so-
called Islamic State. The first part of his presentation outlined al-Qaeda’s change in strategy following 
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s ascension to the leadership of al-Qaeda in 2011. In particular, Weimann 
discussed two documents produced by al-Zawahiri in 2012 in response to the popular revolts: his 
Document in support of Islam and his General Guidelines for Jihad. In these documents, al-Zawahiri 
defines a new strategy for al-Qaeda: al-Qaeda should merge with the population, cooperate with 
other jihadist and Muslim groups, avoid conflict with local regimes where possible and try to take 
control of territory to be used as safe havens, from which it can prepare attacks against Western 
targets. The ultimate aim of this new strategy would be the creation of a “rightly guided” caliphate, 
which would ensure political unity, participative governance, justice and welfare for Muslims. 
Following the publication of these strategic documents, the three major al-Qaeda affiliates, al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jabhat al-Nusra, 
implemented this strategy, which seemed to yield important successes in the beginning. These gains 
were placed in jeopardy by the unilateral declaration of the caliphate by the Islamic State (IS). 
Weimann argued that the conflict between IS and al-Qaeda was not only about the leadership of the 
global jihad movement. The behaviour of IS, in particular the declaration of the caliphate,  
contradicted al-Qaeda’s new strategy to an extent that al-Qaeda had no other option than to expel IS 
from the al-Qaeda network. In addition, the declaration of the caliphate by IS forced al-Qaeda to 
develop more concrete ideas about how a “rightly guided” caliphate could be achieved. 
Traditionally, a caliph can either be elected or appointed by a predecessor. Both options require the 
approval of a group of people known as the al-ḥall wal-ʿaqd (“those who loose and bind”). Based on 
an analysis of four ideological treatises published by AQAP, AQIM and Jabhat al-Nusra, Weimann 
explained how al-Qaeda attempted to address popular demands in the wake of the Arab revolts by 
promising increased opportunities for political participation in the establishment of the caliphate by 
emphasising that the al-ḥall wal-ʿaqd must represent the entire Muslim community. However, the 
challenge al-Qaeda faced in doing so was not to appear to be advocating democratic rule, given that 
salafism rejects democracy as irreconcilable with Islam. 
The resulting new al-Qaeda discourse on the caliphate might not be a consistent political theory, but 
it might enable al-Qaeda to win support with a political project appealing to audiences beyond the 
closed circles of jihadists and to cooperate with forces that do not necessarily subscribe to its global 
jihad ideology. 
In summary, the paper showed that the advent of social media and the ensuing increased 
possibilities for popular mobilisation changed not only the way in which terrorist groups such as al-
Qaeda communicate but also the messages addressed to different audiences and the strategies of 
terrorist groups to relate to local populations. Such changes, however, do not entail a fundamental 
change in the overall ideology of al-Qaeda, which continues to consider Western countries and 
interests as its main targets. 
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Online Finance 
Online Terrorism Financing 
Burke Basaranel, Swansea University 
Basaranel described the similarities between the criminal world and terrorism financing. Though he 
did not give figures of money transferred online through untraceable means such as pre-paid cards 
and through unregistered charities, it was clear that these are popular due to the speed and 
anonymity such means can provide. Basaranel described terrorist organisations’ online fundraising 
to be both a means of raising finance as well as propaganda, and divided the funding methods of 
terrorist organisations into passive and active methods according to the level of coercion of 
fundraisers and consent of donors. 
Basaranel explained that the creation of unregistered charities as a means to launder money has 
long been a method utilized in the criminal world and is now one employed by terrorist groups as a 
means of funnelling money and raising funds in a consensual manner. Moreover, he explained that 
the benefit of using unregistered charities is that they are easier to source revenue for. 
In regard to active methods of online terrorist funding Basaranel described the utilization of pre-paid 
cards. The key feature of pre-paid cards is that they are not tied to an identity but rather just a 
randomly generated code. Pre-paid cards can be used to fund terrorist attacks and operations 
without detection via a simple chain of actions. A terrorist organisation would ask a supporter via, 
for instance, Skype to purchase a voucher from Apple or Amazon and then send on the voucher code. 
The voucher code would then be sold online for less than the voucher’s value in return for cash which 
would go into an account registered to a terrorist organisation or actor. 
Though pre-paid cards and unregistered charities make the money trail difficult to follow, terrorist 
organisations do not yet use virtual currencies such as Bitcoin with the same frequency as criminal 
organisations and have yet to progress fully to more encrypted forms of money transfer. So, whilst 
Basaranel suggested that there should be some form of monitoring of the means he had described, 
the danger with aggressive policies is that they could coerce terrorist groups into using methods 
which are more difficult to track. 
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Cybercrime-funded terrorism and the threats posed by future technologies 
Ltn. Col. Gianluigi Me, Deputy Head of ICT Security Department, Italian Carabinieri; Maj. Giovanni 
Bottazzi, Head of Network Security, Italian Carabinieri 
Bottazzi and Me’s presentation focused on cybercrime and its links to terrorism funding, describing 
the ‘crime as services model’. The presentation also gave examples such as the shutting down of 
nuclear plants and power grids to highlight the potential for cyberterrorism. 
Bottazzi described the prominence and rise of cybercrime. Last year was described by Bottazzi as 
‘The Year of Collateral Damage’. The Internet’s economy generates approximately 3 trillion US dollars 
a year from which cybercrime garners 15-20%, around 400 billion US dollars. With 50% of people 
shopping online and 40% banking online there is access to real money provided that you can find a 
software’s vulnerability – which, according to Bottazzi, every software has. The near-guarantee of 
money and high revenues per action make renting high-tech tools to infiltrate software very attractive 
to terrorist organisations that may not have the technological knowhow.  
Bottazzi presented a grim outlook for the security of money and information online. However he did 
describe bug bounty programs, which expand a company’s recourses affordably, to discover the weak 
points in software. Bottazzi emphasised the importance of increased security online because, as he 
expressed it, “We are no longer individuals but are data clusters”. Time and funding should be 
invested in finding and resolving, for instance, online banking websites’ weak points. However there 
are tensions here. First, new website operators generally want to get their new system out as quickly 
as possible to beat the competition. And, second, weaknesses in the software and user-friendly 
operations often go hand-in-hand, so to fix a bot that has been discovered may hinder the slickness 
of a site. 
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Cyber Surveillance 
Privacy versus security in the cyber-surveillance debate 
Sergei Boeke, Leiden University 
Boeke’s presentation began with an overview of the effect the Snowden revelations have had on 
backdrop surveillance. Prior to June 2013 the US media were often reluctant to report on NSA 
surveillance practices due to government pressure. After the revelation of these surveillance 
programs by Edward Snowden, many of the NSA’s activities were framed as “mass surveillance”. Not 
all of the NSA’s programs should, however, have been seen as mass surveillance and several leaked 
slides were taken out of context and subject to misinterpretations. As a result of the revelations there 
was an internet wide increase in the use of encryption, a shift in business away from US IT companies 
and a chilling effect on internet behaviour. 
The presentation continued with a discussion of the nature of surveillance, privacy and anonymity. 
Surveillance, or the garnering of data for detailed analysis, was defined as the systemic monitoring 
of people without discriminants. The obvious conflict with privacy was broached, and while it was 
conceded that the definition of privacy is contextually and culturally dependent it can generally be 
said to be the right to have control over one’s personal information. It is a basic human right and 
essential for a free and democratic society. While EU data protection laws exist to protect privacy, 
these are only applicable to the private sector. The European Convention on Human Rights does 
constrain governments that are party to the treaty, and there is considerable jurisprudence on 
surveillance and espionage.  
The question of anonymity was discussed by Boeke who argued that to be anonymous is to be 
unidentifiable in one’s actions. Unfortunately there is very little jurisprudence in regards to the right 
to anonymity and contrary to this concept many states have compulsory ID laws. Metadata collection 
is an interesting case to further examine as in many cases the records remain anonymous, and are 
not coupled to identities. Once an investigation focuses on a particular contact or record, however, 
anonymity can quickly be lost, with potential implications for the privacy of the individual concerned. 
The remainder of Boeke’s paper consisted of a series of comparisons. The distinctions between 
domestic law enforcement approaches and intelligence agency approaches were discussed, where 
domestic law enforcement tends to favour targeted, downstream data collection (direct acquisition 
from an Internet service provider) focusing on content. On the other hand, intelligence agencies, 
faced with the task of collecting data abroad, tend to favour upstream bulk collection of metadata 
and content. The differences in operation of three US surveillance programs – PRISM, Stellar Wind 
and the Mystic Program – were then discussed in terms of data collection, analysis and targeting. 
The most important distinctions when looking at surveillance programs is whether the collection is 
at home or abroad, and whether they target individuals (select and then collect) or collect in bulk 
(collect and then select). 
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National Security, Cyber-surveillance and International Law 
Prof Theodore Christakis, Université Grenoble-Alpes, Institut Universitaire de France 
Christakis’ presentation began by outlining the tension between, on the one hand, the consistent use 
of national security arguments by governments to justify the creation of new laws, caveats and 
exceptions, and, on the other hand, the danger that if governments could not do this they might not 
engage with international law. Against this backdrop he then introduced the new French law on 
surveillance. This has two strands: domestic surveillance and international surveillance. Christakis’ 
focus in this presentation was domestic surveillance. He explained that the French Government 
offered a range of justifications in support of the new law, including mainly the prevention of 
terrorism. 
Christakis then outlined the techniques and methods used by the new law, which opponents have 
described as a “French Patriot Act” and a major blow to human rights, as well as constraints on its 
use. He explained the role of the Commission (CNCTR), which has control functions both a priori and 
a posteriori.  
Christakis explained that this law is now facing international legal challenges, including several 
applications lodged with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by journalists and lawyers. He 
then examined the existing case law of the ECtHR starting with procedural issues, specifically, the 
admissibility of applications. Here two issues in particular were discussed; the victim requirement 
and the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In terms of the victim requirement, the difficulty faced by 
individuals wishing to bring a claim under Article 8 ECHR is establishing that they are under 
surveillance, since the surveillance programmes are secret. However, according to the ECtHR in Klass 
and others v Germany, “an individual may under certain conditions, claim to be the victim of a 
violation occasioned by the mere existence ... of legislation permitting secret measures, without 
having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him”.  
Christakis then considered a series of substantive issues. These included the questions whether there 
had been potential interference with the applicant’s rights, whether the restrictions were “prescribed 
by law”, whether they pursued a legitimate aim, and whether they were necessary in a democratic 
society. The latter requires an assessment of necessity, proportionality and consideration of existing 
safeguards.  
Christakis ended by pointing out that the ECtHR has struck down the surveillance laws of several 
states in recent years, and reiterated the importance of legal safeguards such as Article 8 ECHR 
against state misuse of surveillance and other investigative powers. 
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Beyond big data: surveillance, metadata and technology-enabled 
intelligence opportunities in counterterrorism 
David Wells, former Intelligence Officer at GCHQ, the Australian Signals Directorate and the 
Australian Crime Commission 
Wells began his presentation by highlighting recent technological developments which mean that, in 
2016, intelligence agencies have potential access to more data, and more types of data, than ever 
before.  
Although it is difficult to assess intelligence agencies’ use of big data in counterterrorism, Wells 
identified three key terrorism trends since 2012 that point towards the potential benefits of using 
big data in this way. Modern terrorist groups are bigger in both size and scale, operate 
transnationally, and rely on data-generating technology.  
These trends have implications for counterterrorism investigations. First, many agencies are faced 
with more intelligence targets than they can monitor effectively in a targeted and intensive way. 
Second, although the terrorist threat is transnational, many intelligence agencies currently have a 
narrow, predominantly domestic focus. And third, technical intelligence collection options are not 
only likely to be more effective than their alternatives, they are also less risky. Wells argued that 
because of these trends, intelligence agencies can no longer solely rely on traditional intelligence 
gathering methods. Instead, he advocated that they be supplemented by a big data approach.  
Such an approach is not without its own challenges, foremost of which is the rise of widespread 
encryption. This, combined with moves by communications companies to transmit and store their 
data in a manner that is difficult for intelligence agencies to access, makes getting hold of big 
communications datasets challenging. And once accessed, the agency must be able to store, process 
and analyse the dataset in an effective and efficient way to ensure that they derive intelligence value. 
Wells then outlined an example case study of how this might work in practice, demonstrating that 
rather than trawling through large datasets in a manual fashion, intelligence agencies search for 
multiple elements or patterns of behaviour. This results in intelligence analysts looking at a small, 
filtered subsection of the big dataset, containing data largely relevant to their intelligence 
requirements. 
He further identified two key advantages of such an approach: speed, and the ability to identify 
individuals of interest and their communications devices. In the current terrorist and 
communications environment, big data can deliver unique value to intelligence agencies. 
The paper concluded with an assertion by Wells that data collection is just the first part of the 
counterterrorism intelligence process. The collected data must be interrogated through the use of 
smart, focused questions, whether algorithmic or analyst-driven. Big data methods provide unique 
value but they should only supplement other intelligence collection methods. In order to be 
successful, intelligence agencies must combine these methods with intelligence-sharing 
partnerships at both national and international levels. 
 
  
 
 
Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: 
Assessment and Response 
page 31 
Responding to Terrorists’ Use of the Internet 
Terrorist use of the internet and regulation of online content 
Francesca Bosco, UNICRI 
This paper provided an overview of the debate around responding to online terrorist content, 
evaluating the different options of suppression, regulation and engagement. Traditionally, it was 
easier to distinguish between official terrorist websites and accounts and unofficial ones (even if this 
could sometimes be challenging). Now with the prolific use of social networks there is a blending of 
official and unofficial activity. Another issue is the instantaneous nature of modern social media. The 
live tweeting of the capture of Mosul by Daesh forces in 2014 was given as an example. A further 
challenge facing efforts to enforce restrictions on terrorist content on Twitter, Instagram, etc., is the 
fact that the propaganda is being disseminated and filtered by unwitting users as well as supporters.  
The UN has attempted to develop a balanced counterstrategy. Its 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy included ideas and goals aimed at denying terrorists access to their audience. Whilst 
suppression has been the dominant approach thus far, it is a strong form of response and has had 
mixed results. Taking child pornography as an example, there are serious problems with attempting 
to simply shut things down the moment they surface.  
Bosco also identified a definitional problem; there is a lack of international understanding and 
agreement when it comes to online terrorist activity. Furthermore, even if there was unanimity in 
terms of a definition, from a practical point of view law enforcement capabilities vary widely 
worldwide. 
The suppression approach has seen disproportionate knee-jerk suggestions, such as switching off 
satellites or even chopping cables. Efforts at suppression are likely to prove ineffective for many 
reasons, not least the fact that if you shut down activity in one place it will almost immediately pop 
up somewhere else. Generally, there is strong public opinion against filtering; it fundamentally 
conflicts with freedom of expression. It also raises the question of content responsibility: who sets 
the criteria for removing material? Even if these questions could be answered the regulations would 
be difficult to enforce as there is nothing approaching a centralised control over the internet,  nor 
should there be. On the one hand, if a service provider becomes aware of extremist content it would 
be unethical not to act; but on the other hand, would people generally be happy to have their entire 
internet experience monitored? 
The Council of Europe has stated that any restriction of user content must be based on a strict and 
predictable legal framework: a situation that does not exist in most countries. A comparative 
assessment study conducted by the Council into filtering, blocking, or removing information found 
that most countries do not have specific legislation dedicated to this issue. Instead other legislation 
is leveraged into action. The EU itself is unlikely to witness knee-jerk blocking actions due to the 
protections of Article 10 of the ECHR but there are still tensions, especially between law enforcement 
and the private sector. It is noteworthy that EUROPOL has recently established an EU internet referral 
unit which is now fully operational and facilitating cooperating with the private sector. The European 
Commission and several IT companies have also recently announced a code of conduct that applies 
to online hate speech. This illustrates that public institutions are beginning to find ways to engage 
with the private sector. Both hard and soft measures (from removal procedures to raising awareness 
among users) are being employed. But, Bosco concluded, further debate is needed in order to clarify 
the rules that are emerging and to ensure an appropriate balance is struck. 
  
 
 
Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: 
Assessment and Response 
page 32 
Prosecuting terrorist activity in Canada 
Angela Gendron, Carleton University 
Gendron’s focus was the criminalisation of terrorist activity in Canada, in particular the use of 
precursor offences to prosecute those involved in terrorist-related activities as a pro-active 
preventative legislative counter-terrorism measure. 
Gendron began by identifying the central tension between criminalising those terrorist-related 
activities that can reasonably be considered ‘acts preparatory’ to a serious future attack and the 
intention of the courts not to punish “individuals for innocent, socially useful or casual acts which, 
absent intent, indirectly contribute to a terrorist activity.”  As defined in Canada’s Criminal Code, the 
facilitation of terrorism does not require the accused to know whether “any particular terrorist 
activity” has been planned; it is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had knowledge 
and intent to facilitate a terrorist activity.  Proving intent can be problematic but in prosecuting 
offenders, there is considerable judicial discretion to tailor the sentence to the particular 
circumstances and the harm entailed. 
After providing an overview of the Canadian definition of terrorism, Gendron provided examples of 
the precursor offences contained in the Canadian Criminal Code. These included: participating in the 
activities of a terrorist group; facilitating terrorist activity; instructing anyone to carry out terrorist 
activity for a terrorist group; travelling abroad to commit a terrorist act; and, financing terrorism. A 
new offence created by the Anti-Terrorism Act (2015) makes it a crime for any person “who by 
communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences 
in general,” punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.  The Act also includes provisions for the 
seizure, and online take-down of terrorist propaganda and reduces the qualifying criteria for 
preventative recognizance (peace bonds). 
Gendron then provided examples of the issues which had surfaced in the trials of those who had 
been prosecuted in Canada for terrorist-related activities since 2004.  In R v Khawaja, a Supreme 
Court ruling found the ‘motive clause’ in Canada’s definition of terrorism did not infringe freedom of 
expression and therefore did not violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It also affirmed the 
constitutionality of Part II.1 (Terrorism) of the Criminal Code in terms of the scope of the law.  In R v 
Namouh the prosecution case focused on Namouh’s intent in making and disseminating videos for 
the Global Islamic Media Front, while the case of R v Ahmed provided an example of how proactive 
prosecution for precursor activities can prevent the accused from proceeding towards more serious 
terrorist acts. R v Thambaithurai, was the first conviction in Canada for financing terrorism:  the 
prosecution’s task was to demonstrate the accused’s intention to finance terrorism by establishing 
the connection between the World Tamil Movement, for which he raised funds, and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam – a listed terrorist organization. 
Gendron concluded by referring to the case of John Nuttall and Amanda Korody, found guilty of 
planning to detonate pressure cooker bombs at British Columbia’s legislature on Canada Day. 
Sentencing has been put on hold while an allegation of ‘entrapment’ is considered.  Gendron used 
the case to flag concerns that the need to prevent attacks had led to early interventions which can 
deny law enforcement vital evidence.  As a consequence, undercover agents are increasingly being 
used (especially in the USA) to ascertain the intentions of suspect individuals/groups.  In some cases, 
the actions of these agents may cross the boundaries from information gathering to instigation.  For 
example, an undercover agent was a key prosecution witness in the trials of members of the ‘Toronto 
18’ home-grown terrorist cell. 
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Interrupting Engagement with Online Extremist Content: Utilising ‘Noisy’ 
Foreign Fighters 
Dr Jamal Barnes, Edith Cowan University 
Barnes began by explaining that, whilst there has been a large amount of attention paid to CVE 
strategies that seek to remove online content, these strategies will only be effective if used in 
conjunction with counter-narrative strategies. Counter-narrative strategies go beyond removal 
strategies by employing the use of physical and psychological noise to drown out extremist online 
content.  
Against this backdrop, Barnes presented research carried out by the Countering Online Violent 
Extremism Research Program, Exit White Power, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and the 
Richardson Peace Institute. This study examined the response of the audience to “discussion” 
starters about extremist topics in public online forums as well as one-to-one engagements with social 
media. They found that social identity was integral to understanding why individuals engaged with 
violent extremist content. In line with this, counter-narratives that focus on identity rather than 
rationality (facts and figures) generated more of a response from users. Furthermore, shared 
experiences about violent extremism generated similar results as did including civil society in the 
discussion.  
Barnes then used this importance of identity and shared experience to begin his justification for 
rethinking the problem of foreign fighters. In order for counter-narratives to employ the use of foreign 
fighters, efforts must be made by governments and legal systems to move beyond prosecution as 
the only option of dealing with a returning foreign fighter. One step suggested by Barnes was to place 
foreign fighters on a sliding scale of threat instead of treating all of them as dangerous terrorists. 
One example cited was of Denmark who have both a law enforcement and rehabilitation approach 
where foreign fighters wishing to return have been repatriated and offered employment and 
treatment for injuries.  
The reasons why foreign fighters should be used in counter-narratives, Barnes explained, are 
multiple. They have first-hand experience of the narratives which compel people to join extremist 
groups, and their abandonment of these narratives and groups means that they offer a credible voice 
which government-led counter-narratives usually lack. Moreover, foreign fighters can speak with 
authority about the conditions on the ground under ISIS. One of the biggest pull factors in ISIS 
propaganda is the promotion of a life of ‘pure Islam’ under the Caliphate. Returning foreign fighters 
from ISIS territories can be indispensable in dispelling this myth. They can speak about how initially 
they were drawn to the idea of the Caliphate but became disillusioned when faced with sexual 
violence and other violent acts, as well as the killing of innocent Muslims by ISIS. And, in addition, 
returning fighters also have access to radicalised networks in their country of origin and can help 
advance understanding of the motives behind would-be foreign fighters. 
Barnes concluded his presentation by discussing the link between counter-narratives and the offline 
world. Returning foreign fighters are not a silver bullet for efforts to counter online terrorist 
propaganda. In order for counter-narratives to be effective we must look to our own actions in the 
West and how these may be at odds with the narratives we present about ourselves. We must avoid 
giving terrorists and extremist organisations ammunition in the form of Western hypocrisy. Closing 
the gap between online narrative and offline activity is key to countering online terrorist propaganda 
effectively. 
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Hard and Soft Approaches to Countering Online Extremism 
Dr Keiran Hardy, Griffith University 
Hardy began his presentation with a discussion on the nature of hard and soft power. Hard power is 
the capacity to influence behaviour through direct coercion, threats and inducements, whilst soft 
power is the capacity to influence behaviour through the attractive power of culture, ideology and 
institutions. Hardy then introduced Joseph Nye’s notion of smart power. This is where hard power 
and soft power are used in combination in order to develop strategies which are effective in varying 
contexts. He then applied the notion of smart power to the counterterrorism context. This is 
appropriate given that the UK’s CONTEST strategy calls for effective security measures, intelligence 
and policing whilst simultaneously placing equal weight on tackling the social factors underlying 
radicalisation. 
One problem with this active use of both hard and soft power is that it results in situations where 
both may appear to be applicable at the same time. Hardy outlined several possible situations where 
a choice would have to be made between either a legal (hard) or policy (soft) response. For example, 
what is the appropriate response to a person who accesses, reads, downloads and prints extremist 
and instructional materials posted on the Internet? What is the appropriate response if this same 
person shows these materials to others at a local mosque, telling them they should decide for 
themselves whether to support Islamic State? 
This led to a discussion of the UK Government’s Channel initiative, the aim of which is to protect 
vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. The risk factors which Channel uses for 
determining whether individuals are vulnerable to radicalisation often overlap with terrorism 
precursor offences which target the possession of materials associated with an extremist cause and 
supporting violence toward others. A difficulty with this overlap, Hardy continued, is that the close 
relationship between hard and soft power approaches to counter-terrorism creates damaging 
perceptions of surveillance and discrimination in Muslim communities. It leads to claims that work 
aimed at preventing violent extremism is merely a pretext for surveillance and that those delivering 
community projects are no more than police spies.  
The presentation concluded with some recommendations for governments moving forward. In 
particular, Governments need to signal in clear terms what forms of online conduct are: (1) 
potentially unlawful and will trigger criminal investigation and prosecution; (2) not unlawful but 
provide evidence of extremist beliefs and a risk of terrorism, and may therefore trigger a targeted 
intervention or de-radicalisation program; and, (3) legitimate forms of speech that should be 
supported in a free, democratic society. 
 
  
 
 
Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: 
Assessment and Response 
page 35 
Threat Assessments and the Internet 
Dr Paul Gill, University College London 
Gill’s presentation outlined several problems in the scientific study of risk factors of radicalisation. 
First, the literature consistently identifies more and more risk factors – many of which are empirically 
questionable and difficult to operationalise. Second, the study of these risk factors also tends to 
weight them all equally. Building a bomb and being interested in foreign travel are both considered 
equally worrying terrorist indicators in some publications. There is currently no sophisticated way of 
weighting the indicators. Third, we have no idea of base rates when it comes to indicators. Fourth, 
current studies typically tend to treat all terrorists equally.  Bomb makers and bomb planters have 
very different motivations and behaviours. ‘Who becomes a terrorist?’ is a terrible question; there 
are lots of subcategories within terrorism and we need to be more specific. Criminology learned this 
a long time ago but terrorism studies has been slow to follow suit. And fifth, we have very little 
understanding of protective factors.  
The risk assessment of online radicalisation specifically throws up an additional couple of problems. 
First, many people project false images of themselves on online social media platforms. This is true 
for both benevolent and malevolent individuals. Our abilities to tell what is actually true are made 
more difficult when viewing these online behaviours at a distance. Second, there is a huge 
proliferation of extremist material. Analysts are simply drowning in data. There is therefore a great 
need for helping them triage the types of behaviours they need to be looking for.  
Terrorists use the internet in many different ways. In one of Gill’s studies, he found that lone-actor 
terrorists use the internet to learn (about issues like ideology, the need for violence, target choice, 
target choice, attack preperation and how to overcome hurdles they face) and to communicate (on 
reinforcing beliefs, seeking legitimisation, disseminating propaganda, attack signaling and 
recruitment). In a follow up study funded by VOX-POL, Gill et al., studied the online behaviours of 227 
UK terrorists. Gill’s study found that extreme right wing terrorists were 3.5 times more likely to learn 
online than jihadis. However this is not surprising as the extreme right wing terrorists were most often 
lone actors with no support networks. The study also found that those targeting high value targets 
were more likely to conduct online research. Those using IEDs were 3.34 times more likely to learn 
online. Lone actors were 2.64 times more likely to learn online than cell members. The results 
therefore show that different types of terrorists and terrorist attacks will leave a significantly different 
online footprint from one another.  
Gill concluded by suggesting that the major focus on preventing radicalising material is perhaps 
misguided and that a greater focus should be placed upon the materials that provide specific 
practical guidance on how to conduct a terrorist attack. The solution is to minimise opportunity for 
violence rather than countering extremism itself. 
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Anglosphere approaches to counterterrorism policy in cyberspace 
Dr Tim Legrand, Australian National University 
Increasingly states are facing threats that span borders, domestic and international problems are 
blurred and policy makers are much more attuned to transnational threats. The dilemma is that the 
state has been contracting in terms of powers and capacities. It has been hollowed out in favour of 
the private sector and civil society. The state is expected to do more with less.  
What do these challenges look like in the Anglosphere? (Not the neo-con version: saving good of the 
world – though analytically it works well). In his presentation Legrand examined the relationship 
between Canada, the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. These countries share some very 
strong historical and cultural heritage and have a significant history of military alliance. Their 
‘WASPishness’ (White Anglo Saxon Protestant) is shared. The Westminster system, with the 
exception of the United States, has travelled. With common law, similar ideas around democracy, 
mercantilism, capitalism, and state infrastructure these five countries see themselves in each other.  
All have experienced extensive privatisation of critical infrastructure so are facing similar security 
challenges. Since the 1990s 23 policy networks have been established between heads of 
departments or Ministries that involve physical participation. The problem is that researching security 
policy is extremely difficult; there is lower transparency and fewer accountability mechanisms. 
However, there is a distinct pattern of collaboration in the Anglosphere; there has been significant 
security engagement especially since 2009.  
The Five Eyes relationship developed during the Cold War has blossomed into a domestic policy 
alliance, establishing commonalities of security and facilitating significant and increased 
collaboration on shared problems. This is not an ad-hoc development; there is a distinct identity 
formation process occurring.  
The three areas of cooperation are: law and cyber-crime; immigration, borders, and asylum; and, 
domestic violent extremism. Data is shared in all of these domains. There are huge concerns with 
obstructions surrounding encryption, and the most prominent challenges for the future of Five Eyes 
lie in counter radicalisation, pursuit/detection, and public private cooperation. At a ministerial 
meeting between the five countries in February 2016 the question was asked: ‘could we or should 
we collaborate more in counter terrorism and cyber?’ 
This security collaboration is a uniquely special and trusted relationship – other countries are not 
invited in. Ireland – an obvious candidate – is only invited into one tiny aspect. They are hugely 
secretive but increasingly they are generating a consensus over major policy discourses. There are 
explicit invocations, not just about the five countries, aiming to promote international standards 
among foreign partners. They are dominant operationally and they are looking to dominate public 
policy. They possess an unparalleled cyber intelligence system and will try to converge other 
countries’ approaches. 
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Internet forensics as a tool in response to cyber fronts 
Dr Kamil Yilmaz and Dr Murat Gunestas, General Directorate of Security, Turkey 
This paper focused on so-called ‘cyber fronts’. Cyber front groups have similar organisational features 
to terrorist and/or revolutionary groups and provide support for such organisations. Yilmaz and 
Gunestas explained that, since most cybercriminal groups that support terrorist organizations cannot 
perform attacks that could cause death or devastation, they define such groups as cyber fronts of 
terrorist groups rather than as cyberterrorists. While cyber front groups may sometimes be strictly 
bound to a conventional terrorist group, or to a single branch of an organisation, some are not 
necessarily bound to a specific group; instead, they provide support for many of them. The speakers 
introduced CMG-Team (cyber-median guerrillas), linked with the PKK, as an example for the former, 
and also referred to RedHack, a cybercriminal group that supports all forms of revolutionary groups 
in Turkey. 
CMG -Team’s primary responsibility is to protect official PKK sites and support the media branch. 
They are not responsible for further development and, interestingly, their personal data security is 
priority number one, ahead of their other activities.  
RedHack is its own beast, unbound to any other organisation. In their statute they state that illegal 
resources dominate their income. Certain measures are in place for members to follow to gain entry 
to private conversations. They use IRC as a communication channel rather than forums, and are 
known for their opportunistic nature. For example, when TTNET went down for two hours due to a 
technical fault, RedHack were quick to claim responsibility.  
Yilmaz and Gunestas explained that Internet Forensics is a vital phase in today’s investigations into 
cyber fronts. It offers the potential to demystify anonymity – one of the most powerful dynamics of 
cyber space. It is both possible and necessary to cluster anonymous accounts (they have multiple 
redundant and substitute accounts). It is impossible to follow the anonymous users without grouping 
their accounts. Constant monitoring, in addition to this, eventually reveals inconsistencies; for some 
reason the stepping stone might fail for sudden cases, thus revealing the user’s IP address or other 
aspects of their identities. It is also possible to group several accounts that are emanating from the 
same server, even if it is a stepping stone. There are numerous ways of collecting intelligence from 
the web. Little considered are the intentions and actions of rival groups. Politically motivated or 
otherwise, there are always other groups who will share information about their enemies expressly 
for the purposes of this being picked up by authorities. 
In summary, Internet forensics is a powerful tool in two ways: for constantly collecting data; and, for 
processing this big data very fast, in real time when possible. 
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Using social network analysis for the study of public reactions to terrorist 
events 
Daniel Grinnell, Cardiff University 
Grinnell’s presentation explained how social network analysis may be used to look at the impact 
social media users have on public discourse after a significant event, in this case after a terror attack.  
The work was informed by the analysis of empirical data deriving from a technique for the rapid 
measurement of the proportional impact that individual accounts and the ideological stance to which 
they subscribe are having on public discourse.  
The purpose of the work is to give governments, law enforcement, and security agencies an extra 
tool in understanding how segmentation, polarisation and generational conflict can play out after a 
terrorist attack. After the Charlie Hebdo attacks a similar attack was considered ‘inevitable’ by British 
authorities. Understanding how these events are collectively processed by the public is a beneficial 
domain of research, in particular given the potential for these events to spawn conflict and collective 
action that undermines community resilience.  
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are largely focused on understanding the situation at 
hand through the establishment of actionable intelligence surrounding the initial event, rather than 
gauging the community impacts which may result from it. The consequences still play out within 
society, but the authorities largely move on. In this regard the work seeks to answer three questions:  
● Can technological solutions assist in post-event impact detection and analysis ‘at pace’? 
● Can the most important ‘thought leaders’ that fuel these post-event impacts and their 
ideological stance be readily identified? 
● What are the policy and operational implications of implementing this sort of analysis within 
post-event police, security, and government bodies? 
Grinnell explained that open source media analysis can allow for the quantification of the impact 
individual voices and their ideological stance can play in the organisation of extremist post-event 
collective action. These individuals and their messages directly shape the impact and longer term 
consequences of the initial event. Conversely it shouldn’t be ignored that it is possible for police, 
security, and government bodies to participate in this messaging and impact the direction that public 
discourse is taking. This could potentially result in the prevention or diminution of the likelihood of 
violence, if done appropriately and correctly, through advocating de-escalation via community 
respected channels. 
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Recommendations 
1. The workshop highlighted the importance of learning from history, from other cultures, from other 
disciplines and from other research contexts. The value of academic collaboration with non-
academic practitioners and policymakers was also emphasised, including the co-creation of research 
projects and new forms of partnership working. To fully realise the potential benefits of such 
partnership, more innovative and more integrated opportunities should be developed to engage 
academia (including postgraduate research students) at the international level, to feed into policy 
development, law making, and guidance. This should include an active commitment to academic 
freedom and efforts to ensure that academics are able to access, collect, analyse and store data in 
a secure and ethical manner. 
2. Successful multi-agency partnership requires effective communication and inter-partner trust. A 
variety of confidence-building measures, that will help to define frameworks of collaboration, 
intervention and response, should therefore be deployed. These might include: regional (ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), EU, AU, OAS, etc.) or track 1.5 table-top exercises integrating stakeholders 
from the private sector, academia, civil society, NGOs, legal departments, communications 
departments, etc., to run through ‘live’ case studies on how to respond to online content; developing 
and making publicly available a ‘cyber game’ and database of scenarios that can be used to 
understand the impacts of interventions and inform policy development; providing a space or 
collaborative forum where these initiatives, guidelines, scenarios, recommendations, etc., can be 
accessed by the actors, to stimulate dialogue and engagement; and, providing the public and private 
sectors with access to, and information on, emerging guidance on how to balance human rights, 
security and commercial interests in situations involving terrorist use of ICT and the internet, and to 
engage civil society in the process. Collaboration with the on-going projects on these issues might be 
a first step in this direction. 
3. It is dangerous to conflate the activities of hackers/hacktivists and those of (cyber)terrorists. The 
former are distinct from the latter, in terms of both their motivations and the impact of their actions. 
The expertise of this particular community should not simply be ignored; it would be prudent to 
ensure that flaws which are discovered by hackers/hacktivists are resolved. To this end, a safe space 
should be provided for hackers/hacktivists to be able to responsibly report flaws they have 
discovered in the course of potentially criminal activity perpetrated without malicious intent.  
4. The definitions of terrorism precursor offences must strike an appropriate balance between, on 
the one hand, the importance of preventing planned acts of terrorism and, on the other hand, 
ensuring that these offences respect fundamental values and do not over-reach. Accordingly, the 
definitions of terrorism precursor offences should be carefully circumscribed, in particular, by 
requiring proof that the alleged offender had formed an intention to assist, encourage or facilitate 
terrorism-related activity. 
5. NATO operations have second order effects which may contribute to an environment in which the 
risk of radicalisation is exacerbated. Pre-deployment training delivered by NATO member states and 
partners should be developed in accordance with standards and objectives that nurture cultural 
awareness in order to mitigate this risk. 
6. An over-emphasis on the suppression of online terrorist propaganda should be avoided, since 
attempts to suppress such content are beset with practical difficulties and challenges. It is therefore 
important that credible and authentic alternative narratives are developed and delivered, and that 
these narratives are evidence-based and matched by practical action in order not to widen the say-
do gap. 
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7. Once credible, authentic alternative narratives have been developed, it is vital that these are easily 
discoverable. The norms that tech or social media companies and Internet Service Providers develop 
to govern online content should promote the visibility of alternative narratives.  Recent initiatives 
aimed at ensuring that those searching for extremist materials online also find alternative narratives 
are to be welcomed. 
8. In terms of terrorist finance, pre-paid cards are an important existing vulnerability. At present an 
individual can have up to US$2500 with minimal validation of their identity, which is enough to plan, 
coordinate and perpetrate a terrorist attack. A higher level of identity authentication should be 
required to purchase a prepaid card.  
9. More generally, it is important to recognise that financial donations have significant intelligence 
value. Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) should track such transactions in order to disrupt plots and 
identify individuals involved in terrorist financing. Doing so will require a willingness to cooperate 
across borders and share information. 
10. The workshop recognised the value of some surveillance activities in protecting national security, 
but also the harmful effect that misinformation and inappropriate responses have on public 
perceptions. The workshop therefore stressed that state surveillance activities undertaken to counter 
terrorist threats should be accompanied by adequate legal standards and effective guarantees 
against arbitrariness and the risks of abuse in order to fully respect human rights and individual 
freedoms. They must respect the principles of necessity and proportionality and be combined with 
adequate and independent oversight mechanisms.   
 
 
Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: 
Assessment and Response 
page 41 
Appendix: List of Delegates 
Lauri Aasmann (NATO CCD-COE) 
Dr Hayrettin Bahşi (Tallinn University of Technology; founding Director, Cyber Security Institute of 
Turkey) 
Dr Karine Bannelier (Université Grenoble-Alpes) 
Dr Jamal Barnes (Edith Cowan University) 
Burke Basaranel (Swansea University) 
Elena Beganu (NATO HQ Counter Terrorism Section) 
Sergei Boeke (Leiden University) 
Francesca Bosco (UNICRI) 
Maj. Giovanni Bottazzi (Head of Network Security, Italian Carabinieri; University of Rome “Tor 
Vergata”) 
Prof Roger Bradbury (Australian National University) 
Dr Madeline Carr (Cardiff University) 
Prof Theodore Christakis (Université Grenoble-Alpes, Institut Universitaire de France) 
Dr Maura Conway (Dublin City University) 
Joseph Dillon (Dublin City University) 
James Fitzgerald (Dublin City University) 
Richard Frank (Simon Fraser University) 
Bethany Gaines (Swansea University) 
Angela Gendron (Carleton University) 
Dr Paul Gill (UCL) 
Daniel Grinnell (Cardiff University) 
Dr Murat Gunestas (General Directorate of Security, Turkey) 
Adam Hadley (ICT4Peace) 
Sofian Hamiti (Accenture)  
Dr Keiran Hardy (Griffith University) 
Dr Gokhan Ikitemur (Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs) 
Dr Haroro Ingram (Australian National University) 
Dr Lee Jarvis (University of East Anglia) 
Dr Camino Kavanagh (King’s College London) 
Moinuddin Khawaja (Dublin City University) 
Loni Lee (Swansea University) 
Dr Tim Legrand (Australian National University) 
Orla Lehane (Dublin City University) 
Sean Looney (Dublin City University) 
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Prof Nuria Lorenzo-Dus (Swansea University) 
Prof Stuart Macdonald (Swansea University) 
David Mair (Swansea University) 
Chris Marshall (Swansea University) 
Anthony McCoy (Accenture) 
Lisa McInerney (Dublin City University)) 
Ltn. Col. Gianluigi Me (Deputy Head of ICT Security Department, Italian Carabinieri; LUISS Guido Carli 
University) 
Dr Holger Nitsch (Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime 
Research, Germany) 
Dr Lella Nouri-Bennett (Swansea University) 
Leona O’Reilly (Police Force of Ireland) 
Katerina Pitsoli (Swansea University; Université Grenoble-Alpes)) 
Kristiina Raidla-Puhm (NATO CCD-COE) 
Lucy Ray (Dublin City University) 
Dr Alastair Reed (Leiden University) 
Adam Ridley (Swansea University) 
Wolfgang Röhrig (Programme Manager Cyber Defence, European Defence Agency) 
Ryan Scrivens (Simon Fraser University) 
Paul Shorte (Aide de Camp to the United Nations Head of Mission and Force Commander in Lebanon) 
Leonie Tanczer (Queen’s University Belfast) 
Unal Tatar (Old Dominion University; former co-director, Informatics Policies Commission, Turkish 
Chamber of Computer Engineers) 
Lorena Trinberg (NATO CCD-COE) 
Dr Theo Tryfonas (University of Bristol) 
Dr Gunnar J. Weimann (independent researcher) 
David Wells (former Intelligence Officer at GCHQ, the Australian Signals Directorate and the 
Australian Crime Commission) 
Dr Andrew Whiting (Birmingham City University) 
Dr Kamil Yilmaz (General Directorate of Security, Sivas Police Department, Turkey) 
Faisal Zaman (Accenture) 
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